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**CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION:
CORE BUSINESS IN (FUTURE) PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS?**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Core Business in (future)

Peace Support Operations?

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Civil Military Cooperation: Core Business in (Future)
Peace Support Operations?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 01 April 1999 PAGES: 46 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Futurists predict that conflicts between states are becoming less likely. Intrastate conflicts will characterize coming decades. The strategic relevance of Peace Support Operations (PSO) will increase -in Clausewitzian terms; participation in PSO becomes the new politics by other means. The expanding relevance is reinforced by the multinational nature of PSO. PSO require Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) to achieve mission objectives. As it turned out in several recently conducted PSO, CIMIC is essential for establishing a long-term peaceful society. However, many nations fear "mission creep" -military involvements in non-military tasks like nation-building. This essay examines the role of CIMIC in future PSO from a multinational prospective and answers the question -will CIMIC remain core business in future PSO and what problems will be posed for the national strategist?

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CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION: CORE BUSINESS IN (FUTURE)

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS?

After the Cold War the main focus of the United Nations Security Council moved from a potential confrontation between the two superpowers to civil wars and intercommunal violence - so called intrastate conflicts. This incremental shift is consistent with the predictions of futurists that as wars between states become less likely, intrastate disputes will characterize the next decades. The military involvement of nations in intrastate scenarios became known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) - in United Nations terminology Peace Support Operations (PSO). One of the characteristics of these military operations is that they are almost exclusively multinational in nature. Lessons learned from recently conducted operations illustrate that PSO require coordinated and synchronized political, military, and civil participation. Already difficult to achieve at the national level, the biggest challenge remains how to achieve this at the multinational level. Kofi Annan, the present United Nations Secretary General, acknowledged this in April 1998 when he called for more coordinated and synchronized efforts of all involved organizations and agencies, especially in the "post conflict

peace building" phase of PSO.¹ The urgency is clear. But because of the highly complex and wide variety of objectives that have to be achieved it is far from an easy job. Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) already provides a platform to achieve unity of effort. This essay examines the role of CIMIC in future PSO from a multinational perspective and answers the question -will CIMIC be core business in future PSO and what problems will be posed for the national strategist?

The thesis of this paper is that CIMIC is a vital core business in future PSO and its successful implementation will pose significant problems for national strategists. In order to answer the thesis the following four main areas will be discussed. First, what does the future look like? What do (military) theorists and intellectuals tell us about the future nature of conflict? How does PSO fit into the future? Second, what is CIMIC and what are the lessons from recent and ongoing missions? What role does CIMIC play in achieving the desired end-state of a PSO? Third, when the answers to the first two areas are combined what can be said about the importance of CIMIC in the future? Fourth, what are the consequences of the examination in terms of terminology, doctrine, procedures, etc.? How should strategists look at CIMIC? What are the challenges they will face in future?

THE FUTURE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

Since the bipolar balance of power collapsed at the end of the Cold War many authors have addressed the future nature of conflict. Martin van Creveld, a historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, predicts that "we are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks, but of intrastate warfare between ethnic and religious groups."² Explicitly van Creveld rejects the "Clausewitzian" world-picture of organized and legitimate violence as portrayed in Carl von Clausewitz's classic study *On War*.³ Professor van Creveld argues Clausewitz's "trinitarian" model of warfare is no longer valid; the paradoxical trinity of the people, military and the government has changed. The author warns his audience that the age in which rationality governed warfare through policy is unlikely to continue. Instead, there will be a new era of "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) - that old familiar, "partisan" warfare, "updated." In LIC, any individual or class may become war maker or victim, the antithesis of the "civilized" rational warfare advocated by Clausewitz. He notes that unlike Clausewitz's well-known assertion that war is an extension of state politics by other means, wars will begin for other reasons such as justice, religion, and existence. In van Creveld's words "... the Clausewitzian Universe is out of date and can no longer provide us with a proper framework for understanding war."⁴

Professor van Creveld is not a Don Quixote fighting windmills. Ralph Peters is one of many other authors predicting the same tendency of change in the nature of conflict.⁵ Warriors, driven by elementary principles, will fight wars for reasons as basic as survival, group behavior, or ethnic or religious based arguments. For Peters, intrastate conflicts will replace the previous most likely scenarios of conflicts between states. Like van Creveld he argues in one of his other publications that Clausewitz's strategic model based on the trinity of the government, the people and the military is no longer valid.⁶ In his judgment, the trinity should be replaced by the state, the people and information. Important to this study is his conclusion that information will drive policy more than it ever has in the past. If Peters' conclusion is correct there is an increasing risk that countries will be drawn into intrastate conflicts, to a certain extent even against their will. States will become drawn-in for reasons other than traditional national interests, the result of the emotional effect of the wide spread violence and the so-called CNN-effect.

Steve Metz provided similar insights of the future and the military implications of alternative scenarios⁷. In a 1997 publication he elaborated on the earlier thoughts of his colleague Charles Taylor who already in 1988 published his first

edition about alternative world scenarios for strategic planning.⁸

One significant fact emerges from any assessment of alternative future security systems: it is conceivable that the global security system in place by the year 2030 will not be one where interstate war is a significant form of conflict. A continuation of the intrastate conflicts as witnessed over the last decade is more likely. All three conclude nation states will continue to be involved in intrastate conflicts outside their own boundaries because they perceive it to be in their interest. The interest may be humanitarian, to prevent (further) destabilization within a state, or to prevent an uncontrolled spill over of violence to an entire region. Further they conclude that for reasons such as globalization and the increasing importance of sharing political risk, costs and responsibilities in a multipolar world, multinational responses are increasingly the preferred option. The implications for PSO are clear. The probability of involvement in multinational PSO will be greater in the future.

CIMIC: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

"Civil Military Cooperation" (CIMIC) is a concept with a long history. Nowadays, the CIMIC function generally comprises

two types of actions: actions in support of the deployed military force -the familiar "Host Nation Support" from the Cold War era; and actions in support of the civil environment. The latter has increased in importance over the last decade. NATO's definition of CIMIC is as follows:

... the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies, authorities and organizations (MC 411).⁹

NATO spokespersons elaborated on the definition in the following way:

"Firstly, ... CIMIC's only task is to support the commander in the achievement of his mission. It is not a free gift to civilian organizations. And secondly, CIMIC is aimed exclusively at enabling the military and the civilian sides of an operation to achieve greater effectiveness through cooperation. The short-term aim is to achieve cooperation in order to gain tactical advantages and to deny so to the opposition. The long term aim is an end state in which the military are not needed anymore to secure and in which civilian organizations can complete the support to the restructuring of national, regional and local administration."¹⁰

Not all NATO partners agree with the exact terminology. US doctrine uses the term "Civil Affairs" instead of CIMIC and it says that civil affairs activities are conducted: "...in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives."¹¹

Both definitions make clear that currently among NATO nations the primary focus in CIMIC is on the support of one's own forces. The support of the civil environment is not excluded but definitely considered to be of second priority. In that respect there seems to be a common multinational agreement among military establishments in regard to priorities. Saying CIMIC only secondarily supports civil operations is problematic doctrinally if CIMIC is placed in the operational context of




Figure 1: CIMIC in the operational context¹².

a PSO as illustrated in figure 1. The central relationship between the nation's military, the multinational joint force and the government -the overlapping sector of the three circles in

the diagram- is political in nature and is the lynch-pin to the strategic level. The relation between the military, the multinational joint force and belligerent insurgent groups, is mainly military. CIMIC then, forms the bridge between the multinational force and the national and multinational civilian elements in the area of responsibility. CIMIC provides the necessary temporary mechanism for discussion between all involved parties. It facilitates all groups in achieving positive results in their individual efforts to restore a disrupted nation. Once this progress is ongoing sufficiently one of the most important conditions is met to pull out the multinational joint force. By then CIMIC is no longer needed to keep the involved parties on speaking terms.

CIMIC objectives and operations are multidisciplined, complex and interrelated. Dick Zandee identified the wide range of objectives that are to be achieved to restore a fractured society in a 1998 study of PSO.¹³ New state institutions, reconstruction of infrastructure and housing, reformed law and order, a democratically elected government, economic recovery, return of refugees and displaced persons, independent media, and sentencing of war criminals are the most important building-blocks. Other theorists, such as Peter Senge, warn against addressing these areas as separated problems. Senge advocates system thinking --understanding the whole, not only the parts.

Senge's insight is crucial. The common approach in dealing with problems like the ones faced by CIMIC is to break the larger whole down into smaller, more easily manageable and less complicated parts. This could be fatal, Senge argues, because the effect might be that the intrinsic sense to connect the parts to the larger whole, the desired end, gets lost.¹⁴ In the end, it is the larger whole that really counts. Coordinated and synchronized efforts in all areas toward the overall desired end-state are needed to return to a normalized and stable society. The reality is that the multinational military force in theater will likely be deeply involved in "non-military" activities as described by Zandee.

The importance of CIMIC in regard to "Host Nation Support" is not questioned. All nations agree it will remain relevant to every deployment. On the other hand, the support of the civil environment is open to debate and a common doctrine has got to emerge from the lessons learned in recent PSO.

CIMIC: WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED?

What are the lessons learned about CIMIC in recent PSO? The operations conducted in Somalia and the ongoing operations in Bosnia fit best in the framework of this study, and will

therefore be analyzed for potential lessons. First, a look at the Somalia Operations.




Figure 2: Somalia

After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991, the political situation deteriorated, with clans in the northern part of the country trying to secede. Clan warfare and banditry gradually spread throughout Somalia. A humanitarian disaster was the result. More than one-half million Somalis perished by starvation and at least a million more were threatened. The involvement of multinational forces occurred in three stages. United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) I was created

under Security Council Resolution (SCR) 751 in April 1992.

UNISOM I deployed in September 1992 under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to provide protection to humanitarian relief organizations.

In December 1992 the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF) was created under SCR 794, an operation under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to exercise all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. It lasted till May 1993. And finally, UNOSOM II under SCR 814, a Chapter VII operation designed to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, implement a disarmament program, rehabilitate political and economic institutions, and promote national reconciliation. It lasted till March 1995. The UN resolutions initially called for humanitarian assistance to the Somali people and restoration of order in the southern part of the country. Most important was the need to rebuild a legitimate government that became a challenging task in the later resolutions. Somalia was not a case of intervention against the will of a government but of an intervention in the absence of a government. In March 1995 the UN pulled out of Somalia leaving its assigned task of peace building unfinished and Somalia still at war with itself.

There are several observations on lessons learned on CIMIC in the Somalia Operations. Kenneth Allard (1995) noted the following:

"...The real peacekeepers in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future.

...The humanitarian relief organizations can be our allies, but they must at least be part of our planning and coordination efforts.

(And in his conclusions) ... the use of military forces in nation building, a mission for which our forces should not be primarily responsible. While military power may well set the stage for such action, the real responsibility for nation-building must be carried out by the civilian agencies of the government better able to specialize in such long-term humanitarian efforts."¹⁵

According to Allard, in Somalia the military was challenged to coordinate the activities of "49 different UN and humanitarian relief agencies -none of which were obligated to follow military directives."¹⁶ Lessons learned point out that the lack of mission integration from a political, a military, and a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) /Private Volunteer Organization (PVO) point of view prevented proper overall coordinated and synchronized effects. CIMIC turned out to be vital in retrospect, although the efforts were very insufficient.¹⁷

The operations in Bosnia provided CIMIC insights too. After the UNPROFOR debacle late in 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in December 1995. A multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed in early 1996. Its task was to execute the military paragraph of the Dayton agreements.



Figure 3: Bosnia-Herzegovina

After one year, based on initial success, the number of troops was diminished. The transition to a Stabilization Force (SFOR) was established in 1997. The annexes of the Dayton agreement specified a variety of mechanisms for democratization, protection of human rights, and economic development. Specific European organizations accepted roles in creating the post-

conflict state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A large variety of organizations are currently active in this still unstable area.

At the theater level, the original campaign plan of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for deploying IFOR foresaw linkages between the military and civilian leadership. A key element to cover that part was the deployment of an extensive CIMIC (i.e. civil affair) structure, mainly for the support of IFOR troops. At the announcement that the United States would take part in IFOR the U.S. administration stressed that the United States would not engage in nation-building.¹⁸ The United States deployed its troops, known as *Operation Joint Endeavor*, primarily to contribute to separating Bosnia's Muslim, Serb and Croatian armies while the politicians worked on the modalities for establishing a new government.¹⁹

The Bosnia operations are well documented by the periodic reports of the United Nations²⁰, and in the Army Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Reviews (BHAAR I and II).²¹ On civil-military operations the main CIMIC related conclusions were:

"1. Early interagency (NGO/PVOs, international and civil agencies) planning and integration are key to overall success of major international peace operations efforts.

2. Full participation of civil organizations into military operations and training is improving but still needs more emphasis.

3. The US regional CINCs and US operational commands must be closely linked to the interagency structure

during both the planning and execution phase of an operation. And: ... In a broader sense, current civil-military doctrine has not been effectively integrated into routine training and operations."

Others also evaluated and commented on CIMIC in the Bosnia Theater. Gregory Schulte concluded in 1997:

"Implementing the peace in Bosnia has reconfirmed that military success alone cannot guarantee overall success in a peace support operation. Military stability is a prerequisite to peace, but a peace that endures ultimately depends on political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Armed forces can separate warring factions, but they cannot force people to live together peacefully."²²

In the same article he recommends:

"More thinking and resources need to be devoted to filling the conceptual and capabilities gap between military forces and civil policy advisers in peace support operations. Otherwise, future peace building efforts will falter in the absence of local law and order, and military forces will be required to remain in theater well after their military tasks are completed."²³

William Phillips comes to a similar conclusion. He states that CIMIC has proven an essential aspect of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Phillips observes:

"This type of complex emergency draws numerous civil international and non-governmental organizations seeking to assist in a wide range of political, humanitarian, economic, and social tasks. When military forces are also deployed, political authorities and military commanders must work in parallel with and take into consideration civil efforts when planning or conducting operations."²⁴

Since December 1995, both NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) have found CIMIC to be an essential element for military-civilian interaction. As a result of their experiences, one of the objectives of NATO is to increase its CIMIC capacity. In the Force Proposals 1998 the need for six CIMIC-framework groups is identified. The aim is to provide Allied Command Europe with this minimum CIMIC capability by the end of the year 2000.²⁵




Figure 4: NATO's CIMIC 2000 Proposal.

Based on the assumption that conflicts will be secured by a corps sized Force (ARRC or CJTF), a CIMIC group will form the

CIMIC Command and Control, as illustrated in figure 4.²⁶ Some CIMIC units will be placed under operational control of the supported Divisions. The idea is that all nations will contribute to the functional specialists, which are part of the CIMIC Group.

In the United States the Somalia and Bosnia experiences, together with lessons learned from other missions, resulted in Presidential Decision Directive-56, published in May 1997. PDD-56 calls for all U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what lessons are learned from recent PSO experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. The PDD's intent is to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in this kind of operation. PDD-56 specifically requires a political-military implementation plan (or "pol-mil plan") to be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. Government actions in complex contingency operations.²⁷

French civil affairs doctrine, based on a wide variety of experiences in PSO, acknowledges the importance of interagency coordination at the strategic level. Doctrine requires that a strategic assessment of civil-sector conditions should be made. The directive on the conduct of civil-military activities specifies a chain of command for civil-military action at four

levels: political, strategic, operational, and tactical.²⁸ At the strategic level, French military doctrine recognizes three phases: concepts of operations, plans, and conduct of operations. Each of these requires consideration of civil-sector concerns and coordination with appropriate ministries to deal with civil-sector issues.

Among the wide range and multinational experiences in PSO a call can be heard for better coordination and cooperation between all the involved organizations --military, governmental, and non-governmental. Clearly, the interagency process, the cooperation with NGO/PVO's and the procedures within the military need improvement. The role of CIMIC as a coordination mechanism at the operational level is widely accepted, although nations remain reluctant to involve military forces too much. Many countries still consider using military forces for non-military tasks to be "mission creep". Nonetheless, CIMIC is generally accepted to be an essential element for establishing a long-term peaceful society. CIMIC activities provide the bridge for achieving overall unity of effort. Always mindful that CIMIC operations are relatively new to governments, and improvements are part of a slow bureaucratic process based on "learning by doing", the results in recent PSO are nothing less than remarkable. However, despite policy success at the national level, such as PDD-56, there are substantial shortfalls in the

multinational approach. The gap in doctrine and guidance on the international level significantly obstructs the achievement of unity of effort in a multinational or combined PSO.

THE FUTURE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND CIMIC.

As conflicts between states become less likely the strategic relevance of peace support operations will increase substantially. National interests will still drive participation in PSO but increasingly intervening states will define their objectives in terms of world order and values based interests. Success will be defined as a stable, economically viable, democratic state, capable of participation in global economics and politics while providing for its citizens. Approaching PSO in terms of grand strategy becomes more and more appropriate. All the elements of national power are essential, as shown in figure 5, when the restoration of a disrupted nation is the objective of a PSO.²⁹ This incremental shift implies that the motives for PSO become much the same as the motives for general war, in Clausewitzian terms: participation in PSO is a new politics by other means.




Figure 5: Instruments of National Power in PSO.

Understanding the potential role of CIMIC in this new era can not be based solely on recent experiences and the kind of euphoria sometimes heard today as a result of recent success. Emotions generally make conclusions fragile. It is better to use basic and proven principles to provide an objective structure for analyzing the complexities related to war and warlike activities such as CIMIC. Principles of war provide such a framework. William Johnsen, together with four of his colleagues, developed strategic considerations concerning the application of principles of war in the 21st Century.³⁰ Their insights provide a useful framework to assess the role of CIMIC in the future nature of conflict. Johnsen and his associates

provided nine principles of war for the 21st Century: Objective, Unity of Effort (vice Unity of Command), Economy of Effort (vice Economy of Force), Initiative (vice Offensive), Focus (vice Mass), Orchestration (vice Maneuver), Clarity (vice Simplicity), Surprise, and Security.³¹ Because of their obvious and direct relation to CIMIC only the first three principles will be analyzed closely in this paper. The first two are widely accepted as being the most important principles in multinational operations.³² The third will likely become more relevant as the costs become increasingly important in the decision whether or not to participate in a peace support mission.

The principle of objective at the strategic level normally involves every element of national power.³³ The desired end-state of a viable, democratic state, given disintegrating states usually have political, economical and military problems, can only be achieved by focusing in these areas. The development of specific objectives for the use of the various instruments of power poses significant problems of integration and coordination. And if the effort to focus the various elements of power on the desired end-state of a PSO seems complex at the national level, it is considerably more so in an alliance or coalition environment.³⁴ Achieving reforms and maintaining order require negotiating the strategic goals of the CIMIC with coalition partners. Each will have their own motives and thus

somewhat unique desired end-states based on their own national interests. CIMIC officials must be involved as important advisors; they are not the decision-makers. The politicians will decide on the mission objectives. Nonetheless, the results of this process must provide clear guidelines for coalition CIMIC activities. The political level sets the stage and insures that unity of effort can be achieved. Therefore CIMIC must be an element of consideration at the strategic level since it is at the core of success.

Selection of a unifying objective is a fundamental key for success in a multinational or coalition environment, but it is not enough. Traditionally, military organizations have sought unity of effort through unity of command.³⁵ Unity of command is problematic and not likely in PSO, especially with multiple coalition partners and many non-military participants. Achieving unity of effort in non-military and non-traditional ways requires new thinking. As argued before, the stage has to be set at the strategic political level through shared objectives. At the operational level, where the lack of unity of command is manifested, the interdependency of the different parties in the field is the key to unity of effort. NGO's and PVO's are highly dependent on military forces to provide the required stability and security. At the same time, the military is dependent on the success of NGO's/PVO's since their success provides the basis

for the exit of military forces. Exploiting this interdependency is a fundamental role of the CIMIC because it is the bridge between all the involved parties as illustrated in figure 1. When CIMIC works well, the probability that the mission objectives will be achieved is dramatically increased. It is at the core of success.

The third principle, economy of effort, is also problematic, particularly in the multinational environment.³⁶ Johnsen perceived economy of effort as inherently paradoxical. First, he points out that the number of national objectives will always exceed the resources available to achieve them. At the strategic level in the multinational arena priorities have to be established and agreed on. All parties should agree up-front. After the operation commences it is not the time for contributing nations to question the priorities. On the other hand nations individually determine if they will chose to participate in PSO and spend money on the rebuilding of a by "internal rebels" disrupted country. Second, economy of effort is primarily concerned with effectiveness, not necessarily synonymous with efficiency. At the strategic level, economy of effort involves establishing a balance among all elements of national and coalition power, as well as allocating resources in accordance with appropriate priorities. In a multinational environment, however, various individual national desires will

compete based on different national motivations. For example, a nation might perceive that a PSO offered economic opportunities and seek to insure that a large part of the "rebuilding-pie" would benefit the economy of the contributing nation.

Participation in a mission, especially in the post hostility phase of rebuilding a nation, might not only be for moral or political reasons: simple economic gain could be the real motivation. Mission-participating nations might even use CIMIC as the instrument to seek national advantage at the operational level. The risk that "individual" policies will prevail at the end is extremely high. Yet attaining international participation is a fundamental prerequisite. The importance of CIMIC in the eyes of participants is likely to increase substantially for various motives. It is fair to say that CIMIC will become a core-business in future PSO in more ways than one.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES WITH THE CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF CIMIC.

The more PSO is accepted as new politics by other means, and, the more CIMIC is accepted as vital to success in the multinational PSO mission, the more important it becomes to confront the fundamental issues associated with PSO. To begin with the vocabulary, doctrine, and (military) procedures should be more standardized among allied and coalition partners.

Research and personal practical experience prove the necessity of this. The diversity in terminology started when the then United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, as an affirmation to the post Cold War era, published his report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992).³⁷ Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-enforcing became the new vocabulary in the UN glossary. Many countries and organizations, like the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) were already, or shortly thereafter began, working on updating the operational concepts to deal with the realities of the New World Order. Unfortunately, they mainly filled their own doctrinal gap without considering the fundamental multinational nature of these operations.

Defining the vocabulary of the wide range of PSO still is not solved. The term Peace Support Operations is a NATO term and is used as a way to highlight the important, but also limited, role of military forces in the creation of peace. Because "support" is also used for other purposes, the term PSO is not accepted in United States (US) doctrine.³⁸ The expression Peace Operations (PO) is used instead. Today's doctrinal differences among the militaries of UN members and NATO Partners for Peace (support) operations are substantial and are reflected in the vocabulary. US Peace Operation doctrine makes a conceptual distinction between Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcing operations;

Peace Building is called Nation Building.³⁹ In addition to these terms, United Kingdom (UK) doctrine adds Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking and Humanitarian Assistance Operations under the umbrella of PSO.⁴⁰ Nation Building is not part of the UK vocabulary. In UK doctrine Peace Building is used instead. At this point Netherlands (NL) Army doctrine is quite similar to UK doctrine but concludes, contrary to UK doctrine in regard to humanitarian assistance operations, that "a combination with PSO is not a precondition."⁴¹

The confusion and lack of common direction is not limited to military and National Security practitioners. It has been a worldwide topic of interest for intellectuals and theorists at universities and institutes concerned with international relations. The call for collective and coordinated actions, not only by military organizations but also by political, governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, is often heard, however, mostly expressed in only vague and rather general terms.⁴² There is no internationally accepted vocabulary or doctrinal concept for how to discuss and deal with these new challenges.

A solution could be the development of a United Nations doctrine. NATO doctrine could form the basis for the discussion. The differences between some NATO members remain to be solved with or without a United Nations initiative. As a proposal a

workable framework to conceptualize PSO is illustrated in figure 6.⁴³ In this template operations addressed with a three-lined arrow may be part of a multinational PSO or may be conducted unilaterally. Definitionally in this model it is assumed that PSO include activities of all multinational civil and military organizations that are deployed to restore peace and/or relieve human suffering in the failing states.




Figure 6: PSO Categorized.

Mark Walsh uses the term "multidimensional" peace operations expressing the involvement of so many organizations.⁴⁴ PSO may include diplomatic actions, peacekeeping operations,

operations by non-military organizations, and more forceful military actions required to establish peaceful conditions. The challenge for the strategist is how to manage PSO as the new politics by other means.

There is a definite role for strategic CIMIC planning at various levels of both the civilian and military parts of government. Various strategic offices must be capable of developing guidance for the conduct of multinational military operations ranging from peacetime international relations to armed conflict. Such guidance requires an integrated approach taking all the elements of national power into account. In this respect CIMIC should be looked at as an opportunity instead of a threat of "mission-creep."

CONCLUSIONS

As yet, it remains highly probable that intrastate conflicts will characterize the next several decades. At the same time, conflicts between states will become less likely. As a consequence the strategic relevance of PSO will increase substantially. In Clausewitzian terms PSO will become the new politics by other means. Participation in PSO will be driven by the desire of states to pursue their individual and collective interests in an increasingly complex global community. This

implies the use of all the state's elements of national power and international collaboration. Approaching PSO in terms of grand strategy becomes more and more essential to successful operations.

The challenge of PSO to national strategists in this new environment is tremendous. The various leaders and agencies at the strategic level must be capable of developing and executing these multinational and multidisciplinary operations. The real decision-makers for defining the mission objectives are the politicians. However, at the strategic level PSO specialists and CIMIC officials are important advisors. The results of the political process must provide clear guidelines for coalition partners to focus their operations, including CIMIC activities.

CIMIC is the essential means at the operational level for achieving unity of effort. It does this by exploiting the individual strengths of the various players and the interdependency of the involved parties. Thus at the strategic level, success and economy of effort involves establishing a proper balance among all elements of national or coalition power and allocating limited resources in accordance with appropriate priorities. In a multinational environment, however, individual national desires will compete based on different national interests and objectives. The risk that "individual" policies will prevail over coalition strategic priorities in the end is

extremely high. High moral reasons or traditional national interests might not be the only motivation for individual participation in a mission. Simple economic gain could be the real motivation. Mission-participating nations might use CIMIC as the platform to pursue less admirable interests.

The rather new doctrine of PSO is still under exploration by involved governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies. There is an absolute need for cleaning up the current confusing and inconsistent doctrine and vocabulary to limit internal misunderstandings and to improve multinational communication. Doing so improves effectiveness and efficiency of PSO from the start. The need for doctrinal and terminology clarity applies to CIMIC also.

The role CIMIC has as a coordination mechanism on the operational level is already widely accepted, although most nations remain reluctant to get overly involved with military forces. Many nations still consider it "mission creep." However, CIMIC is an essential element for establishing a long-term peaceful society and is the bridge for achieving overall unity of effort. In its proper role, CIMIC precludes military mission creep by properly utilizing all the available resources. It should be looked at as an opportunity rather than a threat. Several initiatives, such as PDD-56 in the U.S., have already been taken to improve unity of effort on the national level.

Similar efforts are underway in other NATO countries. Coordination and cooperation on the international level is a bigger challenge. No major initiatives are currently ongoing to fill this gap. This is indeed unfortunate because in future PSO, as demonstrated in the past, CIMIC is the "core-business."

WORD COUNT = ##### (6550)

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